Introduction
The question "How did language evolve?" has generally been taken to be about the identity and properties of the processes by which linguistic entities or their features evolved. And, on various accounts, a particular family of processes -referred to as "preadaptation", "exaptation", "reappropriation" or "co-optation" -was central to some phase in the evolution of language. These processes, roughly, are ones by which an existing structure or feature acquires a use or function for which it did not originally come into existence. Having acquired such a use, the structure or feature is accorded the evolutionary status of "exaptation". As characterized by Stephen Jay Gould (2002 Gould ( , p. 1234 , an exaptation is "the evolutionary result of functional cooptation from a different source of origin". More technically, "[a]n exaptation is a trait of a population or larger taxonomic unit, than confers performance advantage in a particular way at a specific time but was not produced by natural selection directly for that use". 
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In this article, I aim to examine the way in which linguistic entities or their prelinguistic bases have been assigned the evolutionary status of "exaptations" in some highly rated accounts of language evolution. I will argue that these status assignments are problematic in not being underpinned by a restrictive general theory of exaptation. And I will show how the lack of such a theory contributes to the paucity of the factual evidence bearing on accounts of language evolution.
Exaptationist accounts
Let us begin by considering four specimens of accounts on which certain linguistic entities or some of their features arose through a process of exaptation. The first -and oldest -specimen is Philip Lieberman's (1990 Lieberman's ( , 1991 Lieberman's ( , 1995 model on which preadaptation played two roles in language evolution. These roles are specified in
(1)(a) and (1)(b).
(1) (a) The brain mechanisms that control speech production evolved by preadaptation -i.e., exaptation -from brain mechanisms that facilitated precise one-handed manual tasks. (Lieberman, 1991, p.4) (b) The brain mechanisms that handle syntactic sequencing evolved by preadaptation -i.e., exaptation -from the brain mechanisms that controlled speech production. (Lieberman, 1991, pp. 4, 107-108) These two roles of preadaptation are represented by arrows (a) and (b) in the schematic representation offered in (2) of Lieberman's more comprehensive model of language evolution. The second specimen account is Jenny Wendy Wakefield's (1995, 1996) scenario of the origin of the neuroanatomical structures that underlie linguistic ability.
On this scenario, reappropriation -their term for exaptation -played the role specified in (3) in the origin of these structures.
The neuroanatomical structures associated with Broca's area and the POTthe junction of the parietal, occipital and temporal lobes of the brain -that (initially) had a motor function were reappropriated -i.e., exapted -for the new function of processing sensory input into conceptual structures. (Wilkins and Wakefield, 1995, p. 175) The role assigned to Wilkins and Wakefield to reappropriation is represented by (5) A social calculus provided for the categories of AGENT, THEME and GOAL -also referred to as "thematic roles" -and these categories were exapted to
produce a basis for sentence structures that include arguments. (Calvin and Bickerton, 2000, pp. 136-137) The role assigned by Calvin and Bickerton to exaptation is represented schematically by arrow (a) in schema (6). The fourth and final specimen of an exaptationist account of language evolution to be considered in this article is Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy's co-optationist scenario. On this scenario, co-optation -his term for exaptation -played the role in the origin of syntax specified in (7). (7) The neural organization underlying syllable structure was co-opted -i.e., exapted -to provide a syntax for strings of "words". (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999, pp. 147-148) This role of co-optation is represented by arrow (a) in the schematic representation given in (8) of Carstairs-McCarthy's scenario of language evolution. 
Assumptions about exaptation
Assigning entities a particular evolutionary status, of course, cannot be an exercise in stipulation. This applies to claims (1), (3), (5) and (7) as well. To be able to assign the linguistic entities in question the status of "exaptation" one should, on the one hand, have a theory of the properties by which exaptations are distinguished from entities that evolved by other evolutionary processes -in particular by natural selection. On the other hand, one should be able to furnish evidence indicating that the linguistic entities in question do have these distinctive properties.
A first question that arises in this regard about claims (1), (3), (5) and (7), then, is:
What is the general theory of exaptation by which they are underpinned? The short answer is that none of the four exaptationist accounts draws on an explicitly articulated general theory of exaptation. Lieberman (1990, p. 742) as well as Wilkins and Wakefield (1995, p. 162 ) do refer in this connection in a general way to Darwin's concept of "preadaptation". But they don't derive from it a theory of exaptation which (9) Preadaptation is the evolutionary process by which an organ originally constructed for one purpose may be converted into one with a wholly different purpose. (Lieberman, 1975, p.3; 1990, p. 742) (10) Reappropriation is a process that takes a moment only. (Wilkins and Wakefield, 1995, p. 162) (11) In exaptation, there are no intermediate stages in the evolution of the entity in question. (Bickerton, 1998, p. 354) (12) An entity X -e.g., a syntax for strings of "words" -can be assigned the evolutionary status of "co-optation" if there are close parallels between the structure of X and the structure of a precursor entity Y (e.g., syllable structure). 
Shortcoming of the assumptions
The question, then, is whether assumptions such as (9) -(12) are fit to serve as a basis on which a linguistic entity can be accorded or denied the status of "exaptation". On my analysis, these assumptions fail a minimal condition of adequacy -one adopted in work on exaptation that was done by Gould and Vrba as well as by some of their followers and critics. This condition can be stated as (13). Returning to assumptions (9) - (12), they do not meet the condition of restrictiveness.
This is so because they are not framed in terms of concepts that capture the distinctive properties of exaptations in a sufficiently determinate way. Within the confines of his So the question is: Why should the brain mechanisms at issue not be taken as being used for fundamentally the same purpose, namely sequencing? The problem is that it is not clear how much one purpose has to differ from another to be a "wholly new purpose". This means that the Darwinian notion of a "wholly new purpose" invoked by Lieberman is not sufficiently determined. As a consequence, assumption (9) does not offer a basis for discriminating in a non-arbitrary way between a structure that is an exaptation and one that is an adaptation. The general point has been clarified in a concrete way by Hudson Reeve and Paul Sherman (1993, p. 3) 
Restrictiveness and evidential paucity
The point, then, is that to be able to discriminate in an account of language evolution between entities that are exaptations and entities that have some other evolutionary status, more than loose assumptions of the sort of (9) - (12) To conclude: to the extent that they are restrictive, constraints on exaptation function as "divining rods" -devices for detecting evidence that may be relevant to assigning or denying exaptation status to linguistic entities. Adopting such constraints will, accordingly, lead to an expansion of the limited evidential basis of accounts of language evolution. 
